Coalition climate policy and the national climate interest by Erwin Jackson
Coalition Climate Policy 
and the National Climate Interest
The 
Climate 
Institute
  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Coalition Climate Policy 
and the National Climate Interest 
 
Contents  
Summary 3 
Introduction 7 
Climate Policy – The Coalition’s Position 9 
Cutting Pollution, Boosting Investment – 
Modelling Results 
21 
Discussion – Questions of Scale, 
Diplomacy and Transformation 
36 
Conclusions – Delivering the National 
Climate Interest 
40 
 
Policy Brief 
August 2013 
 
 
Cover Image:  
Michael Hall, Creative Fellow  
of The Climate Institute Acknowledgements 
This policy brief was developed by Erwin Jackson with key inputs 
from Corey Watts, Olivia Kember and John Connor. We also thank 
Amandine Denis and Anna Skarbek for their input on the modelling 
exercise and policy assumptions. The views expressed in this 
policy brief remain those of The Climate Institute. 
 
  3 
 
This policy brief outlines the results of an analysis 
of both the Government’s legislated policies and a 
range of approaches the Coalition could take to 
implement its policy platform.  This analysis is 
based in large part on detailed modelling 
undertaken by SKM–MMA and Monash 
University’s Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS).  
The Coalition is yet to announce details of key 
elements of its policy. To capture a range of 
possible policy options a number of scenarios 
were evaluated, including weakening or 
strengthening the Renewable Energy Target, 
changing the way large emitters are penalised for 
exceeding emission baselines, or giving firms 
access to international markets to achieve 
emission reductions. The modelling is based on a 
number of conservative assumptions about how 
the policy will work in practise and will therefore 
likely overestimate the emission reductions that 
can be achieved under the Coalition’s policy. 
The Coalition supports net Australian emission 
reductions of 5 to 25 per cent on 2000 levels by 
2020.  The Coalition has supported the conditions 
for strengthening targets above the unconditional 
5 per cent target and given in-principle support to 
new international commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  The Coalition also supports the global 
goal of avoiding a 2oC increase in mean global 
temperature above pre-industrial levels.   
This goal can be understood as ‘Australia’s 
national climate interest’ in recognition that 
Australia is an advanced economy that is 
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change.  
A number of reviews of the Coalition’s policy by 
Ernst and Young, the law firm Allens, Treasury 
and others, have identified several potential 
weaknesses in the proposed policy framework. In 
particular, concerns have been raised by industry 
and economic analysts that there is considerable 
uncertainty as to whether the policy can achieve 
its stated goal of achieving at least a 5 per cent 
reduction of emissions on 2000 levels by 2020. 
Experts have noted that the policy creates 
significant uncertainty for business over the 
medium and long-term, that administrative costs 
will be high and that, in the absence of a carbon 
price, other measures such as the Renewable 
Energy Target will have to play a greater role in 
emission reductions.  
Domestic and international experiences generally 
support these conclusions, as mechanisms of the 
nature proposed by the Coalition have not driven 
substantial absolute emissions reductions to date. 
The modelling by SKM MMA and CoPS finds that: 
+ Under all Coalition scenarios Australia’s 
emissions continue to increase to 2020 and 
beyond. Additional emissions range from +8 
to +10 per cent above 2000 levels by 2020. 
This is the equivalent of doubling Australia’s 
car fleet over this period. Even with ongoing 
and increasing budgetary outlays in the order 
of $88 billion dollars from 2014 to 2050, 
emissions continue to rise by around 45 per 
cent over this timeframe. Domestic emissions 
under the Government scenarios increase to a 
lesser extent but the increase is offset by the 
use of international emissions units to meet 
our international obligations. 
Summary 
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+ The Government’s minimum-target carbon 
laws drive substantially more domestic 
emission reductions than the Coalition’s 
policy scenarios. To 2020, the domestic 
emission reductions achieved under the 
current carbon and clean energy laws are 
around 40 per cent stronger than those 
achieved under the Coalition’s scenarios. The 
Coalition’s policy achieves around 200 million 
tonnes of emission reductions domestically. 
This compares to around 290 million tonnes 
under the current legislation.     
+ To achieve the domestic emissions 
reductions that would deliver the 5 per cent 
target the Coalition’s policy requires 
additional taxpayer expenditure of $4 billion 
to 2020. Weakening the Renewable Energy 
Target increases emission reduction costs by 
around $250 million. If the Coalition relaxed its 
 
 
Executive Summary - Figure 1. Modelled 
change in national emissions from 2000 levels in 
2020 and 2030. Results are shown for all 
scenarios (including a case where just the carbon 
price is removed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ban on international emission reduction 
credits the cost of achieving the target would 
be substantially reduced to around $190 
million. If the restriction on international 
permits is not relaxed, achieving the 25 per 
cent emission target would require around 
$15 billion in additional expenditure.   
+ Australia’s carbon productivity falls behind 
global average improvements under 
Government and the Coalition scenarios. 
Under the Coalition’s policies, economic 
output per unit of carbon emissions is 
increased by around 6.4 per cent in 2020. This 
is about a third less than the improvement 
driven by the carbon laws, which achieve a 
10.4 per cent increase. Based on separate 
Treasury assessments, global average 
improvements in a world seeking to avoid a 
2oC increase in global temperature are 
projected to be 40 per cent.  Both 
Government and Coalition policies also 
improve Australia’s energy productivity but 
not to levels implied by the targets of other 
major economies including those of the US, 
EU and China.  
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+ In 2020, even with the Renewable Energy 
Target (RET) unchanged, the Coalition’s 
policy to remove the carbon price reduces 
renewable energy generation to 22 per 
cent by 2020. This compares to 24 per cent 
under the current legislation. Because the 
carbon price increases the wholesale price of 
electricity, it reduces the price of renewable 
energy certificates (generated under the 
legislated target to make investments viable). 
If the carbon price is removed, the price of 
renewable energy certificates increases 
above the levels of the RET’s shortfall penalty 
charge. As a result firms pay the penalty 
rather than invest.  
Reducing the RET, whether explicitly by 
changing the target or implicitly through 
removing the carbon price, produces little 
material economic benefit and may be offset 
by greater costs for emissions reduction and 
wholesale electricity costs.  
Overall, the Coalition’s climate change policy, as 
it is currently outlined or can be reasonably 
foreseen, is unlikely to enable Australia to help 
work with others towards our national climate 
interest of avoiding a 2oC increase in global 
temperature. The Government’s policy also falls 
short but by a lesser margin. 
If other countries followed the same route as the 
modelled policies, The Climate Institute’s 
estimates indicate that the world would be on 
track to warming of 4.5–6.5oC by 2100 under the 
Coalition and 2.0–4.5oC by 2100 under current 
legislation. 
Based on qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
The Climate Institute has concluded the core 
challenges confronting the Coalition are that the 
current proposed policy framework: 
+ Increases emissions and lacks scalability. 
Beyond the practicality of implementing the 
proposed policy framework, the core issue 
remains that the Coalition’s policy constrains 
budget expenditure but does not constrain 
emissions. In line with all independent 
analyses to date, we find that even under a 
variety of scenarios the money available is 
insufficient to reduce Australia’s emissions in 
line with the bipartisan target range, let alone 
drive greater emission reductions over the 
longer term.   
+ Does not make emitters responsible for 
their pollution, effectively subsidising high 
carbon activities. The Coalition’s policy 
currently does not include a broad-based 
price on carbon emissions. Instead the yet-to-
be-determined carbon penalty is applied only 
to emissions above yet-to-be-determined 
‘business as usual’ baselines. This implicitly 
subsidises current emitting activities and does 
not create a broad-based incentive for firms 
and individuals to invest in low emission 
technologies and behaviours. Using a similar 
approach to that used by the International 
Monetary Fund, which factors in a 
conservative estimate of the climate damage 
of every tonne emitted, The Climate Institute 
calculates that this subsidy equates to around 
$50 billion to 2020. This allows emission 
intensive activities to out-compete cleaner 
technologies for a longer period of time. 
+ Risks undermining Australia’s recent 
positive climate diplomacy, undermining 
global action. The credibility and ambition of 
Australia’s domestic policy settings will 
become more important under the new 2015 
agreement currently being negotiated.  That 
credibility comes into sharp relief in 2014 as 
international processes − including a world 
leader gathering − will focus on building the 
pre-2020 emission reduction ambitions of all 
major emitters. A policy that can meet stated 
international targets is central to strengthening 
the emerging architecture, building global 
ambition, and avoiding negative responses 
from other major economies.  Policies that 
cannot demonstrably meet such goals risk 
institutionalising a return to an obstructionist 
or unhelpful climate diplomacy. Regardless, 
international scrutiny and trends would 
continue to put pressure on a Coalition 
government to implement emission trading or 
other more credible decarbonisation signals in 
2015 or soon after. 
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Based on these findings The Climate Institute 
recommends that the Coalition take the following 
steps: 
+ Maintain the current legislative framework 
at least until the completion of detailed 
policy development and further 
independent analysis of the potential of the 
Coalition’s policy to achieve up to a 25 per 
cent reduction in emissions on 2000 levels 
by 2020. This should also include examination 
of the policy in the context of Australia’s fair 
share of a long term global carbon budget 
consistent with helping to meet the national 
climate interest of avoiding a 2oC increase in 
global temperature.  
+ Subject the Emission Reduction Fund and 
associated climate policies to rigorous 
Regulation Impact Statements as outlined 
in the Coalition’s Policy to Boost 
Productivity and Reduce Regulation. This 
should include consideration of the social cost 
of carbon and post-tax subsidies to emitting 
behaviours. 
+ Include within the White Paper process a 
detailed assessment by Treasury of the 
emission reductions resulting from any 
proposed policy frameworks. This should 
include consideration of expanding the ERF to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
include the purchase of credible international 
emission units to ensure Australia’s 
international obligations are achieved. 
+ Adopt the legislated review process with 
the independent Climate Change Authority 
recommending Australia’s carbon emission 
caps, budgets and targets. This review 
aligns with international processes in 2014 to 
increase emission reductions ambitions before 
2020 and should be a key input into both the 
Emission reduction Fund White Paper process 
and Australian submissions on pre-2020 
ambition under the Kyoto Protocol.  
+ Commit to remove the legislated 2014 
review of the Renewable Energy Target and 
focus the 2016 review on post-2020 policy 
settings. Uncertainty in both carbon and 
renewable energy policy is hampering 
investment in low carbon solutions. The 
Coalition has recently re-committed to the 
legislated large-scale renewable energy target 
of 41,000 GWh of electricity generation by 
2020. However, the Coalition intends to 
review the scheme and target in 2014, rather 
than leaving the next review to 2016 as 
recommended by the Climate Change 
Authority to promote investment certainty. 
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Should the Coalition be successful in removing 
the carbon laws this analysis implies much more 
would have to be done to get to 5 to 25 per cent 
emission reduction goals.  Additional regulations 
and actions that would need to be considered to 
strengthen reductions towards their target range. 
These potentially include:   
+ Set declining emission baselines and 
carbon penalties for covered firms 
consistent with driving sustained 
decarbonisation of major emitting sectors. 
+ Establish targets to ensure around 50 per 
cent of generation is renewable (or clean) 
energy by 2030. This should be done by 
legislating a fixed gigawatt-hour target for the 
large-scale Renewable Energy Target. 
+ Require an increasingly stringent emission 
performance standard for existing power 
generation. This should be set to ensure that 
the most emission intensive power generation 
is decommissioned by 2020 and the power 
sector is nearing net decarbonisation by 2030.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This would require non-peaking coal and gas 
plants to have full carbon capture and storage 
from this time. 
+ Implement a more consistent and 
ambitious policy framework to boost 
energy productivity by 30 per cent on 2010 
levels by 2020. Policies to achieve this 
change could include expanding state-based 
energy saving schemes into a nationally 
consistent and robust Energy Saving Initiative, 
implementing ambitious emissions or 
efficiency standards for vehicles, using the 
new national framework for regulating 
Minimum Energy Performance Standards 
(MEPS) to drive more ambitious equipment 
standards and ensuring energy pricing more 
accurately reflects the true costs of energy 
use. These energy efficiency measures, in 
particular, should also be adopted by the 
Government in the absence of a carbon price 
that reflects the benefits long-term action on 
climate change. 
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Every Federal election The Climate Institute (TCI) 
undertakes a thorough qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the climate policies of various 
political parties and independent MPs. We judge 
each policy against our assessment of what is 
required for Australia to contribute to effective 
global climate change solutions, and build a 
prosperous and resilient Australia. The full 
qualitative assessment of the political parties and 
independents is available online.1 The 
benchmarks for the 2013 election (detailed in 
TCI’s Managing the Unavoidable while Avoiding 
the Unmanageable Policy Brief2) focus on:   
+ Cutting carbon pollution. Does the policy 
have the ability to cut carbon emissions by 25 
per cent (from 2000 levels) by 2020 and 
around 60 per cent by 2030? Ratification of 
Kyoto’s second commitment period and 
making a fair contribution to international 
climate finance for vulnerable developing 
countries are also key criteria. Note that both 
major parties have committed to a 5–25 per 
cent target range and share the international 
goal of avoiding 2°C warming. 
+ Accelerating low carbon investments.  
Does the policy establish a carbon price or 
penalty that makes businesses take 
responsibility for their emissions and drives 
structural change in high-emitting sectors? 
Other key criteria include policy stability for 
renewable energy investment, a 30 per cent 
boost in energy productivity, and greater 
corporate and investor transparency of 
emissions profiles.  
+ Preparing for climate impacts. Does the 
policy include an integrated assessment of the 
climate risks under 2°C and 4°C warming 
scenarios for critical infrastructure and 
Government agencies? Does it lead to 
appropriate changes in national policies, 
standards, targets, and oversight? (While 190 
countries have agreed to avoid 2°C current 
commitments would deliver 4°C of warming.)   
This policy brief outlines the results of a 
quantitative emissions and economic analysis of 
both the legislated policies of the current 
Government and a range of approaches the 
Coalition could take to implement its policy 
platform. This analysis is based in large part on 
detailed modelling undertaken by SKM MMA and 
Monash University’s Centre of Policy Studies 
(CoPS).3 
The Climate Institute has also published a 
separate overview and analysis of the current 
Government’s policy settings in partnership with 
the World Resources Institute and the 
international Open Climate Network.4  
That report found that the current policy settings 
allow Australia to meet its agreed emission goals 
of up to a 25 per cent reduction in emissions from 
2000 levels by 2020. The report also highlighted 
that the degree to which this relies on the 
purchase of international permits as opposed to 
emissions reduction within Australia depends on a 
range of factors. These include the influence of 
European carbon permit prices on Australia’s 
carbon price, the maintenance of the large-scale 
Renewable Energy Target, the winding back of 
state-based land-clearing laws in Queensland and 
Introduction 
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the implementation of policies under investigation 
such as light vehicle emission standards and a 
national energy saving initiative.  
This assessment also found that Australia is 
exposed to volatility in international carbon prices, 
which may slow the transition needed to achieve 
longer-term emission reductions. Direct policy 
interventions to reduce domestic emissions and 
boost energy efficiency (for example, stronger 
vehicle emission standards, regulatory 
approaches to limit fugitive emission increases, 
energy efficiency obligations on large energy 
users) would reduce these risks. 
Given the focus of the Open Climate Network 
document, and the many questions currently 
outstanding around the Coalition’s climate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
change policy, this brief concentrates primarily on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Coalition’s 
proposed policy framework.  
The first section of the brief provides a qualitative 
discussion of the Coalition’s policy. The second 
outlines the approach taken in the modelling by 
SKM MMA and the CoPS. Section three presents 
the results of the modelling with a particular focus 
on the impact of the policies on reducing 
emissions and boosting low-carbon investments. 
The brief concludes with reflections on the 
proposed policy frameworks in light of the 
bipartisan supported national climate interest goal 
of avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperature. 
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In the Coalition, we believe now, as we did 
back in 2007, that climate change is real, that 
humanity does make a contribution, and that 
you need a strong and effective policy to deal 
with it.  
Tony Abbott 
Leader of the Opposition 
National Press Club 
31 January 2013 
Both the Government and the Coalition support 
two fundamental planks of Australia’s climate 
policy framework: the international goal of 
avoiding a 2oC increase in mean global 
temperature and the domestic target of reducing 
emissions by up to 25 per cent below 2000 levels 
by 2020.  
This bipartisan support reflects recognition by the 
scientific community that Australia is an advanced 
economy that is particularly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change. Avoiding 2oC warming 
is in our national climate interest. 5 For example, a 
report to Treasury by one of Australia’s leading 
climate experts indicated that a 3-4oC increase in 
global temperature could result in the following 
impacts on Australia:6 
+ Natural ecosystems. Extensive shift and 
deterioration of ecosystems across Australia, 
with risks to natural services. Total loss of 
alpine environments; major incursions of 
pests, weeds, and diseases. 
+ Water availability. Dangerous water 
shortages and contamination events. 
Provision of water becomes a serious limiting 
factor in population growth, production of 
food, and protection of natural ecosystems. 
+ Coastal communities. Coastal inundation, 
storm surges, and erosion requires 
abandonment of some coastal developments 
or the construction of major sea defences. 
Impacts are most significant in low-lying 
regions (e.g. Cairns, Gold Coast, etc.). 
+ Agriculture. Substantially reduced 
production, despite CO2 ‘fertilisation’ effect. 
Major management and wholesale changes to 
farming systems; erosion of the ecosystem 
services that underpin them. Coping capacity 
likely tested in several regions and industries. 
+ Human health. Risks to human life and 
wellbeing from flooding, disease, fire, and 
storms. Coping capacity severely tested in 
some areas, with some public mental and 
physical health interventions essential and 
increasingly costly. 
+ Critical Infrastructure. Infrastructure risks 
from interconnected impacts from extreme 
weather, human ill-health, depleted 
productivity. Requires enhanced emergency 
services; insurance rethought; radically 
different building standards. 
+ International pressures. Enhanced 
international militarisation, tension, and 
conflict. Internal strife spills across borders. 
Water shortage for around half the world’s 
people, health problems for hundreds of 
millions, and hundreds of millions more facing 
food shortages and coastal inundation.  
Humanitarian aid strained by tens of millions 
of displaced peoples in the region and 
regional security jeopardised. 
Climate Policy 
The Coalition’s Position 
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There is currently, however, a stark difference 
between the major political parties as to how our 
national interest objectives are achieved. A 
summary of the Coalition’s climate change 
policies is provided in Table 1. 
There are many market-based approaches that 
could be used to achieve a given carbon 
emissions target. The effectiveness and cost of 
each approach will depend on its parameters, and 
how it manages inherent uncertainties, such as 
the extent of future emissions and the uptake of 
technological solutions.    
Some key parameters have a particularly 
significant impact on the effectiveness and cost of 
any approach.  These include the breadth of 
covered activities, limits on spending, the size and 
nature of penalties, eligibility criteria (e.g. the 
inclusion or exclusion of international units), and 
the ability to ensure that the desired quantity of 
abatement is delivered (i.e. managing the risk that 
specific projects may be delayed, go bust or 
underachieve their objectives).     
The major structural differences between the 
current legislated policy package and the 
Coalition’s approaches are: 
+ A budgetary not emissions constraint. The 
amount of emissions reductions achieved 
through the Coalition’s policy is effectively 
capped by the limit on expenditure from the 
Federal budget. The Coalition’s policy does 
not place a legal limit on major emitters’ 
contribution to global climate change. 
Although the Coalition has given in-principle 
support to an internationally binding limit on 
national emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, 
there is no enforcement mechanism in its 
national policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
+ Limited carbon price and subsidy to 
emitters. The Coalition’s policy will produce a 
shadow price on carbon but this direct price 
signal applies only to the proportion of 
emissions above a yet-to-be-determined 
business-as-usual baseline. As the 
International Monetary Fund recently noted, a 
failure to price all emissions effectively 
subsidises polluting behaviour.7 
+ Domestic not international emission 
reductions. The Coalition has stated that it 
will achieve emission reductions up to the 5 
per cent unconditional target through 
domestic emission reductions alone. Only if 
Australia’s target is greater than 5 per cent 
would it consider the purchase international 
emission reductions. The Coalition has also 
committed to use the federal budget to fund 
emission reductions by stopping deforestation 
in some developing countries, but these do 
not count against agreed emission targets.8 
+ Uncertainty regarding the Renewable 
Energy Target’s future. The Coalition has 
recently re-committed to the legislated large-
scale target of 41,000 GWh of electricity 
generation by 2020. However, the Coalition 
does not intend to remove the review of the 
target in 2014 as recommended by the 
Climate Change Authority to promote 
investment certainty.9 This review, so soon 
after the Climate Change Authority’s review 
completed in late 2012, has had the effect of 
stalling investment in renewable energy, 
potentially endangering achievement of the 
target and increasing the cost of energy 
sector investment in Australia.10 
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Table 1. Summary of the Coalition's climate 
change policy11  
POLICY AREA COALITION POLICY 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITMENTS 
+ Supports agreed global goal of avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperature above pre-industrial 
levels. 
+ Unconditional 5% reduction on 2000 levels by 2020. 
+ Up to 15% reduction if there is a global agreement under which major developing economies commit 
to substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to 
Australia’s, but which falls short of stabilising emissions at 450 ppm. (Note ‘agreement’ does not mean 
legally binding instrument.) 
+ 25% reduction in the event of a global deal to stabilize CO2-e emissions at 450 ppm or lower. 
+ In-principle support for second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol which translates 
unconditional target into a binding international agreement. (Under the Kyoto Protocol, this minimum 
commitment will be reviewed internationally in 2014.) 
+ International financing of projects to reduce emission from deforestation in developing countries. 
DOMESTIC 2020 TARGETS + 5–25% reduction on 2000 levels by 2020 (as per international commitments). 
+ 5% target would be achieved entirely in Australia (no international permits). 
+ Repeal legislated domestic emission cap for sectors covered by emissions trading. 
DOMESTIC LONG-TERM 
TARGETS 
+ None (but will review post-2020 policy in 2015). 
+ Repeal legislated 80% reduction target. 
+ Supports agreed global goal of avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperature above pre-industrial 
levels. 
PRINCIPAL EMISSIONS 
REDUCTION MEASURE 
+ Emission Reduction Fund (ERF), a grant-tendering scheme: 
 
- Cheapest emission reduction options will receive Government funding through a reverse auction 
process. 
- Funding will not be delivered until project implemented and abatement achieved. 
- Current Carbon Farming Initiative would be the platform to deliver the ERF. 
- Budget commitment of $2.55 billion over the forward estimates. This initial commitment is 
capped. Original policy included $10 billion in funding to 2020. The Coalition has indicated that 
funding after the forward estimates will be reviewed in 2015, as part of the broader review of the 
policy. 
- Post-2020 policy will be reviewed and determined in 2015. 
CARBON PRICE + Financial penalty for companies that exceed an emissions baseline based on business as usual: 
 
- Baselines will be derived from historical National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) 
Scheme data. New entrants will have baselines set by ‘best practice’. 
- Full details of carbon penalty and baseline setting process to be determined in consultation with 
business in 2013/14. 
 
+ Repeal of current legislated carbon pricing mechanism as soon as possible. 
GOVERNANCE + Clean Energy Regulator to manage ERF and carbon penalty scheme. 
+ Repeal of legislation for independent statutory reviews by the Climate Change Authority of Australia’s 
emission targets and domestic policy mechanisms. 
RENEWABLE ENERGY + Supports retention of Renewable Energy Target (RET) and goal of 41,000 GWh large scale target in 
legislation. 
+ Will undertake legislated review of RET in 2014. 
+ Supports $3 billion Australian Renewable Energy Agency. 
+ Repeal of $10 billion Clean Energy Finance Corporation. 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY + Supports current legislation for mandatory energy efficiency standards for appliances and equipment. 
OTHER MITIGATION + Ancillary programs include funding for a One Million Solar Roofs program, Solar Towns and Schools, 
Clean Energy Hub for regional areas, a Geothermal and Tidal Town, and urban reforestation. 
ADAPTATION + While risks of climate change scenarios are recognised, climate impacts are not included in key 
policies such as those for northern Australia or Infrastructure Australia.  
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Independent reviews of the Coalition’s policy 
To date a number of reviews of the Coalition’s 
policy have identified several potential strengths 
and weaknesses: 
+ Ernst and Young (for the Australian 
Industry Group)12. Grant-tendering schemes 
are unlikely to drive lowest cost abatement. 
Any additional costs required to meet a given 
target will ultimately be borne by taxpayers 
(including businesses) through increased 
taxation or diverted funds. While the policy 
may provide some short-term certainty, the 
policy creates significant uncertainty for 
business over the medium and long term. 
Uncertainty also extends to how the baseline 
and carbon penalty system will work, whether 
it will reduce emissions and the impact it will 
have on trade-exposed industries. Given its 
limited coverage, the policy is unlikely to drive 
broad-based innovation and research and 
development in low-carbon technologies. 
+ Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency13. Analysis based on previous 
programs and published estimated emission 
reduction costs suggests that the emission 
reductions that could be achieved under the 
policy are subject to very large degrees of 
uncertainty, both in terms of scale and cost. 
The emission reductions ‘claimed by the 
Opposition [are] very difficult to support on the 
basis of relevant experience’. 
+ Treasury14. The economic costs of the 
Coalition’s policy would be higher than 
Treasury’s estimate of an emission trading 
scheme similar to the Governments because it 
forgoes the use of international markets and 
does not support broad-based emission  
reduction activities. The fiscal cost of the 
policy may be higher or lower than a broad-
based carbon pricing mechanism depending 
on whether the projects funded actually 
reduce emissions and the ability of 
participates in the scheme to game the 
auction process. 
 
+ McLennan Magasanik Associates (MMA)15. 
In 2009, The Climate Institute commissioned 
MMA to assess the strengths and weakness 
of baseline and credit schemes and cap and 
trade systems. The following points from this 
analysis apply specifically to the baseline and 
credit element of the Coalition’s policy: 
- Administrative costs under a baseline 
and credit scheme are likely to be 
higher as these schemes are more 
complex to administer. Under a cap 
and trade system, a cap is set and 
emissions are monitored against this 
emission limit. Under a baseline and 
credit system, a baseline has to be set 
for each emitting activity, usually 
based on historical emission and 
production rates. This means that the 
administrator has to establish a 
baseline for each activity at each 
facility (generating plant, mine and 
industrial plant). This is complicated by 
the fact that emissions intensities differ 
widely even amongst plants in the 
same industry (for example, methane 
emissions from coalmines differ widely 
from mine to mine). The cost of setting 
and verifying baselines for each of 
these sites could be very high. 
- As the carbon price in baseline and 
credit schemes only applies to 
emissions above the baseline, it offers 
a weaker price signal than the carbon 
price applied to every tonne of 
emissions under an emission cap. This 
diminishes the incentive to produce 
and consume less emission intensive 
goods, or undertake less emission 
intensive activities. 
- Baseline and credit systems offer less 
certainty that the system’s targets for 
emission reductions will be achieved. 
Unlike a cap and trade scheme, which 
accounts for absolute emissions, a 
baseline and credit system is based on 
emissions intensity. This means that in 
any one year there is no certainty that 
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a target will be met. Baselines may 
need to be continually reset to ensure 
targets are achieved; this creates 
policy uncertainty for market 
participants.  
- The uncertainty surrounding the ability 
of a baseline and credit system to 
achieve its own targets increases the 
risk of failing to meet internationally 
agreed national targets. To meet the 
agreed national target may require 
additional purchases of large 
quantities of domestic reductions or 
international permits, imposing 
additional liabilities on taxpayers. 
Alternatively, a country unable to reach 
its target may renege on its 
international obligations, undermining 
global action. 
+ The Australia Institute (TAI)16. Competitive 
grants could potentially play a part in a well-
designed suite of policies to reduce 
emissions. However, given experience with 
similar programs it is ‘excessively optimistic to 
place all of Australia’s emissions reduction 
eggs in the competitive grant basket’. TAI 
suggests the ERF will cost far more than has 
been budgeted for and is unlikely to find 
sufficient greenhouse gas reduction projects 
to reach even the minimum 5 per cent target. 
If the average cost of abatement for 
competitive grant schemes conducted 
previously in Australia were to apply to grants 
provided through the ERF, the Fund would 
need to allocate around $100 billion by 2020 
to achieve Australia’s minimum emissions 
target. TAI also notes that the Coalition’s 
policy would require a very large number of 
public servants to administer effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
+ Allens17. In the absence of a broad-based 
carbon price there ‘will be no deep pool of 
demand for emissions abatement that can 
provide a source of long-term revenue to 
underpin projects.’  Investors face a high 
degree of uncertainty, as funding is 
dependent on the outcome of successful 
auctions, not locked in prior to project 
commencement, and reliant on annual 
budgetary appropriations. Funding 
predictability may be further reduced by 
additional economic and environmental 
selection criteria. The absence of any effective 
or enforceable cap on Australia’s carbon 
emissions means there is no guarantee that 
emissions will be reduced. In the absence of a 
meaningful carbon price, the Renewable 
Energy Target will play a greater role in 
emission reductions. 
Domestic and international comparisons: the 
evidence from similar policies 
Domestic and international experiences generally 
support these conclusions. In particular, the 
mechanisms of the nature proposed by the 
Coalition have not achieved substantial absolute 
emissions reductions to date (Table 2). They do 
have a role but generally in supporting broader 
regulations and/or carbon pricing mechanisms. 
Table 2 shows a range of domestic and 
international schemes similar to the Coalition’s 
Emissions Reduction Fund. A number of these 
scheme are cited by the Coalition (e.g. Norway’s 
Energy Fund and Fund for Climate, Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency Measures and 
India’s ‘Perform-Achieve-Trade’ energy efficiency 
obligation for industries), as similar measures. The 
table does not include the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which the Coalition 
sometimes cites as an example, because the 
CDM is part of a global cap-and-trade system 
defined by binding pollution limits.18  
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Table 2. Australian and international examples of 
emissions policies with similarities to the 
Coalition's approach. Baseline-and-credit 
schemes share similarities to the Coalition’s 
proposed baseline-and-penalty approach. Grant-
tendering schemes are similar to the ERF. 
  
Scheme Design Features Comments 
Intensity or baseline and credit emission/energy saving schemes 
Alberta, Canada:  
Specified Gas Emitters 
Regulation (SGER)i,ii,iii,iv 
 
Alberta accounts for one-
third of Canada’s emissions 
and has committed to: 
+ Reduce emissions by 
20 million tonnes (Mt) 
below business-as-
usual levels by 2010, 
and 50 Mt by 2020 
(This represents an 
absolute increase in 
emissions on 2011 
levels of ~7%).  
+ Reduce absolute 
emissions by 14% 
below 2005 levels by 
2050 
Alberta’s intensity-based 
model is under 
consideration as a model 
for a federal approach for 
certain sectors 
Start date: 2007 
 
Targets: Reduce annual emissions intensity up to 
12% below a baseline established using 2003–2005 
averages for emissions and production. For facilities 
that entered commercial operation after 1999 there 
is no target for first three years of operation. A 
baseline is then set using averages from the third 
year of commercial production and the target is 
phased in until it reaches 12% in the ninth year of 
operation. 
  
Coverage: Sets emissions intensity targets for 
facilities which emit more than 100,000 tonnes (t) of 
CO2-e. (Around 100 facilities covering approx. 50% 
of Alberta’s total emissions are included.) 
  
Compliance: To meet targets facilities can reduce 
emissions intensity (or use a banked credit from a 
previous years reduction); pay a penalty of CA$15/t 
into a technology fund; purchase a domestic 
emission offset (including soil carbon); or purchase 
an emission credit from a covered facility that has 
reduce emissions below their target  
In 2010, 42% of compliance was delivered through 
paying the penalty; 6% though facilities reducing 
emissions, 18% through purchasing credits from 
other facilities and 35% though domestic offsets 
 
Overall emissions continue to increase and Alberta 
is unlikely to achieve its 2020 targets without 
significant additional actions: 
 
+ Analysis of SGER suggests it is unlikely to 
deliver more than 5 Mt emission reductions 
below business as usual in 2020 
+ Alberta’s emissions are projected to grow by 
26–37 million tonnes between in 2007 to 2020  
+ Alberta’s Auditor General has raised serious 
concerns around the validity of soil carbon and 
other emission offsets in the scheme. This 
strongly suggests emissions reductions 
achieved through SGER have been 
overestimated. 
 
New South Wales, 
Australia: Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Scheme 
(GGAS)v,vi,vii,viii 
 
GGAS was one of the 
world’s first mandatory 
carbon markets. It is a 
baseline and credit scheme 
and did not include 
absolute emission caps on 
electricity market 
participants. 
Start date: 2003 (closed 2012) 
 
Targets: Annual electricity benchmark greenhouse 
target was set (7.27 tonnes of CO2-e per capita in 
2012). Individual electricity retailers and certain other 
companies who buy or sell electricity in NSW were 
then set mandatory targets based on the size of their 
share of the electricity market. 
 
Coverage: Forty-two participants in 2011 including 
28 licensed electricity retailers, 1 electricity 
generator, and 25 large users of electricity. 
 
Compliance: Compliance permits generally traded 
between $5–$15/t over the life of the scheme. 
Participants could also surrender offset credits from 
activities managing forests carbon. Penalty for non-
compliance was $17/t in 2012.  
Federal Government projections estimate that 
GGAS reduced electricity sector emissions by 0.7 
Mt in 2010. 
 
Researchers found that a significant proportion of 
the tradeable ‘abatement’ certificates were unlikely 
to correspond to the actual emissions reductions. 
The Department of Climate Change has arrived at 
similar conclusions. 
 
i  EDF and IETA, 2013, Alberta - The World’s Carbon Markets: A Case Study Guide to Emissions Trading, Environment Defence 
Fund/International Emissions Trading Association, Washington, D.C. 
ii Matthew Bramley, Marc Huot, Simon Dyer and Matt Horne, 2011, Responsible Action? An assessment of Alberta’s greenhouse gas 
policies, The Pembina Institute, Alberta. 
iii P.J. Partington, Matt Horne and Clare Demerse, 2013, Getting on Track for 2020, The Pembina Institute, Alberta. 
iv Auditor General of Alberta, 2011, Report of the Auditor General of Alberta—November 2011, Edmonton. 
v Government of New South Wales, Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme: http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/   
vi Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2010, Stationary energy emissions projections, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra. 
vii Robert Passey, Iain MacGill and Hugh Outhred, 2008, ‘The governance challenge for implementing effective market-based climate 
policies: A case study of The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme’, Energy Policy 36: 2999– 3008. 
viii Department of Climate Change, 2010, Analysis of Coalition Climate Change Policy Proposal, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
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Table 2 continued. 
  Perform-Achieve-Trade, 
India ix, x 
 
India’s industrial and 
electricity sectors are 
responsible for around 60 
per cent of the country’s 
emissions. 
 
The PAT scheme is 
intended to contribute to 
India’s development 
objectives: strengthen 
energy security, reduce the 
energy deficit, 
enhance the global 
competitiveness of Indian 
industries, and reduce the 
sectors’ emissions intensity. 
 
Energy use and emissions 
are reduced relative to 
business as usual growth 
projections rather than 
absolute reductions and 
this is reflected in the 
national emission reduction 
commitment. 
 
Start date: 2012, after a four-year development 
process. Energy saving credits (for above-target 
achievement) issued in 2013, and credit trading to 
begin in 2014. 
 
Coverage: Facility-specific targets for 478 
organisations across 8 sectors: power, iron and 
steel, cement, fertiliser, aluminium, pulp and paper, 
chlor-alkali and textiles.  
 
The average target is a 4.8% reduction in energy 
consumed per unit of production. Total energy to be 
saved equates to 6.6 Mt of oil equivalent and 26 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) 
over the program’s first cycle (2012-2015). 
 
Compliance: Each facility is assigned a specific 
energy consumption (SEC) reduction target 
compared to a baseline. The SEC is expressed in 
tonnes of oil equivalent per tonne of product. The 
baseline SEC is set as the average for the period 
April 2007–March 2010. Companies receive 
tradeable certified energy savings credits for 
efficiency gains beyond their targets, and can buy 
credits to make up any shortfall. Credits will be 
issued after the first year of the scheme, with the 
trading price set by the market. 
 
During the design phase, companies’ 2005–10 
production and energy consumption data were 
audited. Baseline energy audits were undertaken in 
2011. Annual audits and verification by designated 
auditors. Penalties will be the price of energy credits 
needed to make up any shortfall.  
Scheme is still in early stages of establishment and 
no results are yet publicly available. 
Top 1000 Energy-
Consuming Enterprises 
Program, China xi,xii, xiii 
 
Industrial energy 
conservation program 
targeting energy-intensive 
sectors. Expanded to ‘Top 
10,000 Enterprises’ in 2011 
 
The program complements 
China’s other initiatives 
such the shutting down of 
inefficient coal fired power 
stations, renewable energy 
laws, differentiated power 
prices for energy intensive 
industries and emerging 
emissions trading schemes. 
 
Start date: 2006 
 
Targets: Energy savings of 100 million tonnes of 
coal equivalent (tce) from 2006 to 2010. 
 
Participating enterprises were each set a target 
expressed as total energy savings in 2010 against a 
growth baseline. Companies’ targets were set taking 
into account their industrial sector, the energy saving 
target for the province or municipality in which they 
were located, and the ‘general technology level of 
the enterprise’.  
 
Coverage: Companies in the following sectors that 
consumed at least 180,000 tonnes coal equivalent 
(5.3 PJ):  iron and steel, petroleum and 
petrochemicals, chemicals, electric power 
generation, non-ferrous metals, coal mining, 
construction materials, textiles, and pulp and paper. 
 
Compliance: Mandatory. Rewards and penalties, as 
well as supporting programs technical assistance 
and information dissemination, were provided to 
companies and to the relevant provincial 
governments. Government officials were evaluated 
annually on the achievement of the targets within 
their jurisdictions.   
Reported savings of 150 million tonnes of coal 
equivalent (tce) – 50 per cent over the target. Total 
emission reductions from 2006- 2010 of almost 400 
million tonnes. 
 
However, the program was implemented very quickly, 
without time for detailed analysis of company 
baselines and targets. There is also a shortage of 
publicly available data to test the reported results at 
the enterprise, sector, provincial or national level. 
Some proportion of these savings may well have 
been made in the absence of the program.  
 
Supporting programs (such as energy audit 
assistance) were slower to implement. Lack of 
standards and guidance for energy audits and lack of 
expertise within companies meant that audit quality 
was highly variable. 
 
ix Neelam Singh, 2013, Creating market support for energy efficiency: India’s Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme,. Climate and Development 
Knowledge Network, London.          
x Rajesh Kumar, Arun Agarwala,. 2013, ‘. “Renewable Energy Certificate and Perform, Achieve, Trade mechanisms to enhance the energy 
security for India’,India”, Energy Policy, 55: 669-676. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.12.072. 
xi Second National Communication on Climate Change of The People’s Republic of China, 
http://nc.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/NationalCCC/UpFile/File116.pdf 
xii Mark D. Levine et al. 2010. Assessment of China’s Energy-Saving and Emission-Reduction Accomplishments and Opportunities During the 
11th Five Year Plan. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and Azure International , Berkeley and Beijing. http://chinauseealliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/LBNL_Assessment-of-China%E2%80%99s-Energy-Saving-and-Emission-Reduction-Accomplishments-and-
Opportunities-During-the-11-th-Five-Year-Plan.pdf 
xiii Industrial Energy Efficiency Policy Database, ‘CN-3a:Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Program’ [webpage] 
http://www.iepd.iipnetwork.org/policy/top-1000-energy-consuming-enterprises-program 
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Table 2 continued. 
  
Abatement purchase schemes (grant tendering) 
Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Program 
(GGAP) xiv, xv, xvi, xvii  
 
GGAP was a government 
fund which aimed to 
purchase emission 
reductions with a view help 
Australia’s achieve its first 
Kyoto target. 
Start date: 2000 (ended 2009). 
 
Budget: $400 million over four years. 
 
Coverage: Emission reduction projects from 
projects including co-generation, energy efficiency, 
travel demand management, alternative fuels, and 
coal mine gas technologies. 
 
Compliance: Strong additionality conditions were 
implemented to ensure that Government funds went 
to projects that would not have otherwise occurred. 
 
Reviews of the policy by groups such as the 
Australian National Audit Office have found: 
  
+ Emission reductions were ‘substantially less’ 
than projected – 15.5 Mt of the planned 51.5 
Mt. 
 
+ Many of the projects approved by the Minister 
did not proceed – 9 of the 23 approved  
projects (valued at $44 million) were 
terminated due to failures to meet contractual 
obligations and operational difficulties. 
 
+ Only 40% of its original budget allocation was 
spent –$121.1 million of $400 million. Low 
uptake was in part driven by conditions of real 
emission reductions which: 
- increased administration and compliance 
costs. 
- meant businesses had to factor in the risk 
that they proceed through the process 
and but do not receive funds. 
Clean Technology 
Program, 
Australiaxviii 
 
Established by the 
Commonwealth 
Government as part of the 
Clean Energy Future 
package to help 
manufacturers invest in 
energy efficiency, this 
comprises three sub-
programs:   
Clean Technology 
+ Investment Program 
(CTIP) 
+ Food and (CTFFP) 
Foundries Investment  
Program  
+ Innovation Program 
 
Start date: 2012 (forecast to close by 2019) 
 
Budget: $1 billion (approx.) in grants of up to 50% of 
project costs 
 
Source of funds: indicatively, carbon price revenue 
 
Objective:  CTIP and CTFFIP aim to help 
manufacturers invest in energy efficiency capital 
equipment and low pollution technologies, 
processes and products.  
 
Grant criteria:  
+ CTIP – extent of  reduction in emissions 
intensity, extent of enhanced competitiveness; 
(large grants) contribution to manufacturing 
industry, and broader economic benefits 
+ Innovation Program – extent of emissions or 
energy consumption reduction; commercial 
potential; technical strength; applicant 
capability. 
 
Targets: None specified.  
Grants to date total $290 million, expected to 
leverage a further $850 million in private 
investment. 
 
CTIP and CTFFIP 
As of 21 April $557 million in total grants and co-
funding, expected to result in abatement of 11.37 
Mt CO2-e in total. 
 
Cost per tonne of emissions reduced (as of April 
2013) 
- Grant funds $15.80/tonne  
- Total funds $49/tonne 
 
There is no additionality requirement in the CTP, so 
many of these projects may have been 
implemented to some degree anyway. 
 
The Clean Technology Programs help reduce 
emissions in sectors also covered by carbon price, 
so both policies are at play to drive emissions 
reductions. 
 
 
 
xiv Department of Climate Change, Coalition Climate Change Policy Proposal. 
xv Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2008, Strategic Review of Australian Government Climate Change Programs, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra. 
xviAustralian National Audit Office, 2010, Audit Report No.26 2009–10, Performance Audit, Administration of Climate Change Programs, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
xvii John Daley and Tristan Edis, 2011, Learning the hard way: Australian policies to reduce carbon emissions, Grattan Institute, Melbourne. 
xviii AusIndustry, 2013. ‘Clean Technology Programs’ [webpage], 
http://www.ausindustry.gov.au/programs/CleanTechnology/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 8 August 2013. 
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Table 2 continued.  
Abatement and 
technology funds, Norway 
xix, xx, xxi  
 
Norway has several funds 
targeted at reducing 
emissions and facilitating 
low carbon investments. 
They are administered by 
Enova, a public body under 
the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy. 
 
Norway has a national 2020 
emission target to reduce 
emissions by 30-40% 
below 1990 levels. 
 
Norway has also introduced 
a carbon tax of between 
NOK190–410/t ($A35-$75/t) 
and is part of the EU’s 
emission trading scheme. 
 
Energy Fund 
 
Start date. 2001 
 
Sources of funds. Charge on electricity 
transmission; interest income on capital and returns 
from the Green Fund for Climate, Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency Measures (below). 
 
Budget. around 2 billion NOK (A$370 million)/year 
 
Objective:  ‘Promote environmentally friendly 
restructuring of energy end-use and energy 
production, as well as development of energy and 
climate technology.’ Specific goals: 
- Development and deployment of new energy 
and climate technologies (at least 10% of 
funds).  
- Increase efficiency, flexibility and diversity of 
energy supply and use. 
 
Targets. For 2012–2015, funded projects must 
achieve 6.25 TWh. (This includes renewable energy 
and energy savings.) 
 
Coverage. Immature energy technologies, buildings, 
and industry.  
 
Compliance. Enova estimates energy impact before 
grants; project proponent documents energy impact 
once project is operational; three years after 
operations commence, Enova reviews. 
Enova assesses projects both by their cost per 
kWh achieved over the project lifetime, but also 
according to their alignment with the Energy 
Fund’s objectives.  
 
Funding must also enable (‘trigger’) projects that 
would not be implemented otherwise. 
 
Over 2001–2011, the Energy Fund spent 10.7 
billion NOK (A$1.9 billion), for the following results 
within that timeframe:  
- Energy impact: 435,000 tonnes oil 
equivalent 
- Direct emissions reduction: 1.5 Mt CO2 
- Direct plus indirect emissions reduction: 
2.7–9.6 Mt CO2  
 
By comparison, Norway’s carbon tax on offshore 
petroleum is estimated to have cut emissions by 
5 Mt CO2 in 2010 alone. 
 
 
 
 Green Fund for Climate, Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Measures (replacing and 
expanding on the mandate of the “Basic Fund”) 
 
Start date. 2012 
 
Source of funds. Government revenue 
 
Budget.35 billion NOK (A$6.4 billion) increasing to 
50 billion NOK (A$9.1 billion) by end of 2016. 
 
Operations. Interest earned from Green Fund is 
used by Energy Fund. Energy Fund expected to 
receive 220 million NOK (A$40 million) from Green 
Fund in 2014. 
 
Targets. Two-thirds of Green Fund allocation must 
be spent on domestic projects. 
 
 
xix Enova, 2012, Annual Report 2012, Enova, Trondheim. 
xx Government of Norway, 2009, Norway`s Fifth National Communication under the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status 
report as of December 2009, Norwegian Ministry for the Environment, Oslo. 
xxi Bellona Foundation, personal communication, 23 July 2013. 
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The Coalition has also likened its policy to the 
water market in the Murray-Darling Basin. The 
Coalition argues that Commonwealth purchase of 
water-use entitlements from willing sellers in an 
effort to meet environmental objectives sets a 
precedent for its ERF policy. The government-as-
buyer element of Australia’s water policy is, 
however, only a part of a larger system of 
established, limited and tradable water 
entitlements; every megalitre used has a market 
value. A cap is set to ensure overall water 
extraction moves towards more sustainable 
levels. Trade in water entitlements helps to reduce 
the costs of the cap by allowing scarce resources 
to find their highest value industrial use. In other 
words, Australia’s water market more closely 
resembles the legislated carbon market than the 
Coalition’s policy.  
Figure 1. Federal Budget climate and clean 
energy commitments: 2000/01 to 2013/14 
($millions, adjusted for inflation).19 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis of Federal Budget papers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget risks to climate policy objectives 
Experience shows that federal budget 
commitments, whether to climate programs or 
any other policy, can vary widely year to year 
depending on the particular politics and budget 
pressures of the time (Fig. 1).   
 
Such volatility and exposure to political whim is 
the reason why many in the energy industry have 
argued for the shift of technology support from 
the federal budget to more sustainable programs 
like the Renewable Energy Target in order to 
improve investor certainty. 
 
There is no justification to assume that future 
budget commitments would be any safer from 
change. As with the Coalition’s auxiliary mitigation 
measures (Solar Towns and Schools, etc) the ERF 
would be subject to a high degree of fiscal 
uncertainty. Although the Coalition has committed 
annual funds to the ERF in its forward estimates, 
it has also said it will review the policy and 
potentially revise it in 2015.  
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Modelling the Coalition’s emission 
policies 
The Climate Institute engaged SKM MMA and the 
CoPS at Monash University to undertake the most 
extensive quantitative examination of the 
Coalition’s proposed carbon reduction 
mechanisms to date.20 
In this assessment, SKM MMA’s National 
marginal abatement cost model was used to 
provide insights into, and assess the options likely 
to be funded under, both the Coalition’s policy 
and the Government’s legislated carbon-pricing 
mechanism. 
The model assesses a range of emissions 
abatement opportunities in sectors covering 
energy, transport, agriculture, industrial 
processes, fugitive emissions, , and waste. 
Median estimates of the emission reductions from 
the land sector are used.   The likely cost and 
potential emission abatement of all the options 
eligible under a specified policy is assessed and 
ranked from lowest to highest cost (in terms of $/t 
CO2-e). 
This assumes that the lowest cost combination of 
options in covered sectors will be selected under 
the fund up to any budget or emissions limit. Only 
options that are additional (i.e. would not have 
proceeded in absence of the fund) are 
considered. Relevant outputs under the  emission 
reduction modelling and other relevant external 
assumptions have been input into the MMRF–
Green model of the Australian economy to 
determine relevant macroeconomic outputs.    
The Coalition is yet to announce details of key 
elements of their policy. To capture a range of 
possible policy options a number of scenarios 
were evaluated.  
 
 
 
 
 
+ Minimum carbon laws (Reference case). 
The current legislated policy environment. 
There are two important points to consider 
here. Firstly, domestic emissions will be 
affected by the carbon price and other 
policies like the Renewable Energy Target.  As 
Australia’s carbon price is likely to be largely 
shaped by international markets, the 
modelling uses a simple carbon price pathway 
consistent with Government and market 
forecasts of global prices. Low or higher 
carbon prices would change the balance of 
emission reductions between domestic 
actions and the import of international units 
outlined below. For example, higher carbon 
prices would favour more domestic emission 
reductions. 
Secondly, domestic emission reductions are 
not the total of Australia’s contribution to 
avoiding climate change. To meet a given 
target Australia can also import credible 
emission reduction credits from international 
markets. In the modelling any gap between 
domestic emissions and the target is met with 
the import of international credits. This 
represents the practical situation whereby the 
Government sets an emission limit consistent 
with a stated national target and businesses, 
are able to decide, within defined limits, 
whether to reduce their emissions or buy an 
Australian or international credit to meet 
emission liabilities. 
 
In the results presented below both domestic 
only and net (including imports of credits) 
emission reductions are shown, where 
appropriate. The modelling assumes that at a 
minimum Australia will meet its international 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. A range 
of emission outcomes is also shown in some 
cases. These represent possible outcomes 
from the process that is underway to set 
Australia’s final emission target in 2014. 
Separate macroeconomic modelling indicates 
that under current policy settings stronger 
targets are very unlikely to have a material 
impact on Australia’s economy as the carbon 
price is largely determined by global actions 
not Australia’s target.21  
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Note the modelling does not account for 
recent policy announcements to bring forward 
the emission trading scheme by one year. This 
will not, however, materially impact the results 
presented. 
 
+ Coalition (Base case). Carbon price scheme, 
Clean Energy Finance Corporation and other 
revenue transfers such as assistance to trade 
exposed industries are repealed on 1 July 
2014 and replaced by an Emission Reduction 
Fund with funding capped as announced.  
Baselines, penalties for emissions above 
baselines, and new entrant baselines 
assumptions to be set as outlined in Table 3.  
+ Coalition (Lower RET). As with base policy 
scenario but Large-scale Renewable Energy 
Target (LRET) is reduced to match a ‘real 20 
per cent’ level by 2020 and a 25 per cent level 
by 2025. This scenario assesses the impact of 
weakening the Renewable Energy Target after 
the 2014 review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ Coalition (High RET). As with base case but 
RET increased to 30 per cent by 2020 and 50 
per cent by 2030. This scenario assesses the 
capacity of a stronger Renewable Energy 
Target to bridge any shortfall in emissions 
reductions from 2020 onwards. 
+ Coalition (Absolute baselines). As with base 
policy scenario but baselines are set in 
absolute terms. The scenario is a sensitivity 
analysis of the impact of changing company 
baselines from intensity (e.g. tonnes of 
emissions per unit of value add) to absolute 
(e.g. tonnes of emissions). This scenario also 
includes an effective ban on new traditional 
coal-fired generation to represent more 
stringent baselines for new entrants.   
+ Coalition (Decline and trade).  As with base 
policy scenario but baselines decline in line 
with the national emissions reduction average 
required to meet the national emission target. 
Liable entities can purchase international and 
domestic units to avoid being penalised, or 
sell credits for emissions below their baselines 
to other liable parties.  
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Table 3. Key assumptions in the modelling of the 
Coalition base policy. 
  
FUNDING. There is uncertainty around budget commitments to the ERF past the forward estimates. The modelling assumes 
past commitments are honoured and there is a cap on funding set at $300 million in 2014/15, $500 million in 2015/16 and 
$750 million in 2016/17, $1.0 billion in 2017/18 and $1.2 billion in 2018/19 and in 2019/20.  Budgets after this period has not 
been announced but is assumed that funding will increase by 5 per cent per annum thereafter.  
 
ERF grants apply to actual abatement as it occurs and are set at pay-as-bid rates. Funding is spread over a typical operating 
life up to 10 years to ensure long-term performance. It is assumed that approval would take one year so that the program 
would be installed in the normal installation period plus one year. 
REVERSE AUCTION BIDS. Bids won through the reverse auction process are assumed to cover the cost of abatement that 
could not be covered by normal commercial transactions (i.e. the net incremental cost of adopting the option) plus 
compliance costs.  
ADDITIONALITY. The amount of emission reductions for each project will be determined as the net change in emissions 
compared to conventional versions of the technology. It is assumed that the intent will be to achieve additional abatement 
over and above what would have occurred under business as usual conditions. 
BASELINES. NGERS data is used to derive baselines for each entity registered under the scheme. Baselines are set at the 
entity’s historical average emissions intensity for the three years to and including 2010–11. Intensity baselines will be set 
using value add as the numerator. For new entrants and expansion of existing capacity, emission intensities will be set at the 
top Australian rate for each sector. 
CARBON PENALTY. Growth and emission intensity projections from the MMRF–Green model are used to determine whether 
the carbon penalty is paid in regard to the historical baseline: projected emissions above the historical baseline for industry 
sector incur the penalty.   
 
Modelling of the carbon penalty regime is a key element of the analysis. The penalty acts as a shadow carbon price in 
investment decisions to expand or for new entrants to enter. Firms have the choice either of paying the penalty when 
expanding or entering, or of investing in low-emissions technology. The choice will depend on what is the least cost. Firms 
can avoid paying the penalty (on emissions above baselines) if it is lower cost to invest in new technology.   
 
The penalty for emitting above baselines is set at $15/t in 2014/15 increasing to $20/t in 2020, escalating by 6.5 per cent per 
annum in nominal terms (and about 4.0 per cent in real terms) thereafter. The penalty of $15/t is comparable to that that 
operated in the NSW Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme and currently operated in Alberta’s Specified Gas Emitters 
Regulation (Table 2).  
 
(Note: In most cases, as is the intent of the Coalition’s policy, the penalty payments are not triggered. This is because of 
modelling assumptions that see industries naturally improve their energy efficiency through time. These improvements occur 
because due to technological developments each new generation of capital goods is likely to be more energy efficient than 
the one before.) 
LAND SECTOR REDUCTIONS. The Carbon Farming Initiative is expanded to all sectors under the ERF. Baseline emissions 
based on Government emission projections with no carbon price induce estimates of new Kyoto Protocol accounting 
changes and an estimate of the impact of changes in regulations on land clearing in Queensland. SKM MMA allowed for the 
median estimate of the potential for soil carbon in Coalition policy cases. There is, however, considerable uncertainty around 
the actual emissions reductions that might be delivered by payments for soil carbon management.* Many of the land 
management practices required to build up and maintain significant and sustainably higher levels of carbon in the soil are 
unlikely to prove financially attractive under Coalition policy. The modelling is likely to overstate emission reductions as a 
result.     
ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE COSTS. Administrative cost of this process is assumed to be $2/t and $3/t abated 
in line with costs incurred under the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program and NSW Energy Savings Scheme programs. 
These costs are set at a fixed rate to reflect economies of scale. For example, the administration cost would be high if the 
program includes soil carbon initiative because of the small size of grants. Emissions reduction options which see the 
aggregation of effort are also included. It is assumed there will be a rigorous process to determine that abatement will be 
additional, and this takes time to evaluate.   
ADDITIONAL EMISSION REDUCTIONS. To the extent that proposed Coalition carbon policies do not achieve the target, 
there is the option of closing the deficit by sourcing international credits and/or purchasing more domestic emissions 
reductions.  A post-modelling exercise was undertaken to calculate the cost of purchasing sufficient units to bridge any 
deficit between abatement achieved and both the 5 and 25 per cent emission reduction targets.  
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This section comprises The Climate Institute’s 
analysis of the modelling results from SKM MMA 
and CoPs.22 A summary of the results is provided 
in Table 4.  
Table 4. Summary of SKM–MMA/CoPS modelling 
results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under all scenarios the economy and 
employment continue to grow strongly. For 
example, Gross National Income per capita grows 
by around $6,900 by 2020 under the current 
policy framework and by around $7,200 under 
Coalition policies. The macroeconomic impacts of 
the carbon laws and the Coalition’s policy are not 
directly comparable. 
  
Cutting Pollution,  
Boosting Investment 
Modelling Results 
 
 
    
LEGISLATED  
CARBON LAWS 
COALITION 
VARIABLE Metric 
Net intl 
trade 
Domestic 
only 
Base 
Lower 
RET 
High RET 
Absolute 
baselines 
Declining 
baselines 
and trade 
NATIONAL EMISSIONS 
2020 EMISSIONS 
% change on 
2000 
-5% 5% 9% 10% 8% 9% 9% 
EMISSIONS GAP: 
2013–2020 
Mt CO2-e 0 182.7 265.7 275.9 240.3 267.6 253.7 
DOMESTIC 
ABATEMENT TO 
2020 
Mt CO2-e 287 287 204 194 229 202 203 
INTERNATIONAL 
ABATEMENT TO 
2020 
Mt CO2-e 184 - - - - - 12 
TOTAL NATIONAL 
EMISSIONS TO 
2050 
Gt CO2-e 15.3 24.3 27.7 27.6 26.1 27.1 26.5 
ADDITION 
GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE TO 
MEET -5% 2020 
TARGET 
billions Real 
2012$ 
- - 
 $          
4.07  
 $          
4.32  
 $          
4.12  
 $          
4.08  
 $          
3.46  
ADDITION 
GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE TO 
MEET -25% 2020 
TARGET 
billions Real 
2012$ 
- - 
 $        
14.91  
 $        
15.16  
 $        
14.96  
 $        
14.92  
 $        
14.30  
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Table 4 continued. 
  
 
LEGISLATED  
CARBON LAWS 
COALITION 
VARIABLE Metric 
Net intl 
trade 
Domestic 
only 
Base 
Lower 
RET 
High RET 
Absolute 
baselines 
Declining 
baselines 
and trade 
 MACRO ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
GNP/PERSON: 
CHANGE 2020 
Real 2012$ 
 $        
6,884  
 -  
 $        
7,183  
 $        
7,183  
 $        
7,178  
 $        
7,183  
 $        
7,183  
GNP/PERSON: 
CHANGE 2020 
% change 8.8% - 9.2% 9.2% 9.2% 9.2% 9.2% 
EMPLOYMENT: 
CHANGE TO 2020 
Thousands of 
persons  
        
1,201.7  
 -  
        
1,229.5  
        
1,229.5  
        
1,244.6  
        
1,194.5  
        
1,238.6  
EMPLOYMENT: 
CHANGE TO 2050 
% change 10.7% - 11.0% 11.0% 11.1% 10.6% 11.1% 
CARBON 
PRODUCTIVITY: 
CHANGE TO 2020 
% change in 
Real 2012 
$GDP/t natl 
emissions 
- 10.4% 6.4% 5.2% 7.5% 6.2% 6.8% 
BOOSTING LOW CARBON INVESTMENT 
CARBON 
INTENSITY: 
CHANGE TO 2020 
% change in 
national 
emissions/Real 
2012 $GDP 
-14% - -11% -10% -12% -10% -11% 
ENERGY 
PRODUCTIVITY: 
CHANGE TO 2020 
% change in 
Real 2012 
$GDP/final 
energy 
consumption 
(PJs) 
5.5% - 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 
RENEWABLE 
ENERGY 
GENERATION: 
2020 
% electricity 
generation 
(TWhs) 
24% - 22% 22% 24% 22% 22% 
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Cutting Pollution 
Under all Coalition scenarios Australia’s 
emissions continue to increase to 2020 and 
beyond. Emissions increase by 9 per cent (8-10 
per cent range) above 2000 levels by 2020 (Fig. 2 
and 3). This creates the need for additional 
emission reductions of around 270 million tonnes 
to 2020 to achieve the minimum target (Fig. 4). 
Even with ongoing and increasing budgetary 
outlays in the order of $88 billion dollars23 to 2050, 
emissions continue to rise by around 45 per cent 
over this timeframe. 
The Government’s carbon laws drive substantially 
more emission reductions domestically than the 
Coalition’s policy scenarios (Fig. 5). To 2020, the 
current carbon laws achieve around 470 million 
tonnes of emission reductions, of which around 
290 million tonnes occur domestically. This is 
roughly 40 per cent stronger than the domestic 
emission reductions achieved under the 
Coalition’s scenarios. (In the scenario where the 
Coalition substantially increases the Renewable 
Energy Target domestic emission reductions are 
comparable to current minimum carbon laws to 
2030.) 
To achieve the emissions reductions required to 
deliver the Coalition’s commitment to the 5–25 
per cent targets would require additional 
expenditure of $4–$15 billion to 2020.24 Access to 
Kyoto’s international markets could reduce this 
budgetary  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cost to around $190-$710 million. Conversely, 
weakening the Renewable Energy Target 
increases these costs by around $250 million. 
Neither the Government or the Coalition currently 
has long term policies in line with the emissions 
reductions required for Australia to play its fair 
part in global efforts to avoid a 2ºC increase in 
mean global temperature.25 This conclusion could 
be changed if the Climate Change Authority 
recommends a credible long-term carbon budget 
for Australia, aligns the national emissions 
trajectory to this goal and the Government 
accepts these recommendations.26 
Emissions to 2050 in the Coalition scenarios are 
around 14–22 billion tonnes more than more 
equitable contributions over the period (Fig. 7). 
The carbon laws result in emissions 3–9 billion 
tonnes above. Put another way, the average 
Australian would emit nearly three times the 
global average under 2oC climate scenarios under 
the Coalition’s modelled policies. Under the 
carbon laws scenario it would be around one and 
half times more.   
The Climate Institute estimates that if other 
countries followed the same route as the 
modelled policies implied then the world would be 
on track to warming of 4.5–6.5oC by 2100 under 
the Coalitions and 2.0–4.5oC by 2100 under the 
current legislation.27  
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Figure 2. Total national carbon emissions 
(2012–2030). National carbon emissions are 
shown for the period 2012–2030 for each of the 
scenarios assessed. Coalition scenarios are in 
grey. Both the base Coalition case and the range 
of outcomes from all the other Coalition scenarios 
are shown.  
The impact of current carbon legislation is shown 
in several ways: net emissions (solid green line), 
domestic emissions reductions only (dotted green 
line), and possible emission reductions if the 
emissions cap is strengthened following the 
recommendations of the Climate Change 
Authority (green area). 
These are compared to emission reductions 
associated with Australia’s national climate 
interest of avoiding a 2ºC increase in global 
temperature (‘National climate interest’, blue 
area).      
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013 
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Figure 3. Modelled change in national 
emissions from 2000 levels in 2020 and 2030. 
Results are shown for all scenarios (including a 
case where just the carbon price is removed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Shortfall in emission reductions to 
achieve minimum 2013–2020 emission 
reductions (million tonnes of CO2e). Australia’s 
international commitments require us to limit 
emissions to a certain amount of pollution over 
the period from 2013 to 2020. This figure shows 
the additional cumulative emission reductions 
required to meet this goal and an equivalent 
target associated with our conditional 25 per cent 
reduction goal. 
  
Figure 3-7 Source: 
The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013 
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Figure 5. Sources of emission reductions 
across scenarios (million tonnes of CO2e). 
Emission reductions take into account indirect  
impacts of the policies such as reductions in 
energy demand due to impacts on power prices, 
as well as direct impacts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Additional expenditure required to 
achieve a given emission target to 2020 (Real 
2012 $billion). International unit imports are based 
in access to Kyoto carbon markets. Relying solely 
on these markets to meet a given emission target 
would not be credible domestically or 
internationally. 
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Figure 7. Emissions vs 2oC carbon budgets. 
Total emissions over the period from 2012–2050 
are compared to two national carbon budgets 
under scenarios where Australia makes a more 
equitable contribution to avoiding a 2ºC increase 
in global temperatures. The 2 ºC carbon budgets 
are based on two different approaches to more 
fairly sharing the global carbon budget: 
contraction and convergence (‘C&C’), where per 
capita emissions converge in 2050, and an equal 
per-capita budget (‘Equal per cap’) where 
Australia does not emit more on a per capita basis 
than other developed nations. The carbon laws 
25-80 per cent scenario assumes the Climate 
Change Authority recommends a 25 per cent 
reduction by 2020 and this is accepted by the 
Government. It also assumes the 80 per cent 
reduction by 2050 is the minimum long-term 
reduction. 
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Comparing results with other analyses of 
Coalition policy: why the differences? 
It is important to note that other analyses, 
including one undertaken in 2010 for The Climate 
Institute28, has found that the Coalition’s policy 
could see much larger emission increases in 
2020.29 
This is in part explained by different estimates of 
the size of the emission reduction task to 2020. 
For example, Government projections suggest 
that to achieve the emission targets in the 
absence of a carbon price requires around 755 to 
1,265 million tonnes of emission reductions to 
2020.30 This may be an overestimate, as it does 
not consider recent changes in electricity 
consumption and economic growth. Energetics 
estimates that 275 million tonnes of emissions 
reductions to 2020 would achieve the minimum 5 
per cent target.31  
SKM–MMA’s projections suggest an abatement 
challenge less than the Government projections 
but higher than Energetics: around 370 million 
tonnes to 2020.32  
This modelling also makes a number of 
assumptions that are fairly generous to the 
Coalition’s proposal. First, it assumes that the 
ERF and the associated baseline and carbon 
penalty scheme can be established by mid-2014.  
If the Coalition does not control both houses of 
Parliament repeal of the existing carbon laws is 
unlikely before the end of 2014/early 2015.  
The modelling also assumes that all the emission 
reduction projects are delivered to schedule and 
achieve anticipated emission outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International and domestic experience shows that 
it is difficult to prove that all the projects that 
occur under approaches similar to that proposed 
by the Coalition are truly additional and would not 
have occurred anyway (see for example Table 2).  
For example, under the Clean Development 
Mechanism, which has taken years to develop 
and has implemented increasingly stringent 
accounting frameworks33, analysis suggests that 
around 20-30 per cent of renewable projects 
supported would have occurred regardless of the 
mechanism34. If this proportion were to apply to 
the Coalition’s policy another 40-60 million tonnes 
of emission reductions would be needed to 
achieve agreed international targets. 
Additionally, the modelling presented here 
suggests the marginal cost of reducing emissions 
under the ERF will be lower than other estimates. 
SKM–MMA modelled a marginal cost of 
abatement of around $30/tonne in 2020. In 
comparison, the former Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency estimated the 
policy’s marginal cost of abatement to be 
$50/tonne in 2020 (Fig. 8).35  
The difference is explained by SKM MMA’s 
assumption that the reverse auction process 
proposed by the Coalition will deliver some 
projects at lower cost per tonne than others and 
that this will be reflected in Government 
payments. Treasury notes that this can lower the 
cost of the scheme. 36 However, Departmental 
analysis has also concluded that bidders will act 
strategically to maximise the returns on projects 
and this will lead to a higher fiscal cost than 
actual emission reduction costs. For example, 
firms bid higher than their actual project costs but 
just lower than that of their competitors.  
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Figure 8. Indicative comparison of estimates of 
dollars per tonne emission reductions for ERF 
and other low emission programs. ERF 
estimates are based on SKM MMA modelling, 
initial estimates by the Coalition37 and other 
independent analysis.38,39 Cost per tonne of 
existing and past programs is based on Grattan 
Institute40 and the Productivity Commission41. 
Grant-based programs and programs driven by 
legislated targets and not reliant on Government 
funding are grouped. Note that costs are not 
directly comparable as different assumptions are 
used in different analysis, so this should be seen 
as an indicative comparison. 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013; 
Coalition, 2009; The Australia Institute, 2011; Grattan Institute, 2011 
and Productivity Commission, 2011.  
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Boosting low carbon investment 
 
A great competitive margin in the world is 
going to be over carbon and energy 
productivity. Countries that slip behind… are 
going to damage themselves and their 
competitiveness and prosperity in the coming 
years. 
Lord Nicholas Stern 
Launch of The Climate Institute’s  
Global Climate Leadership Review 
March 2013  
Maintaining economic competitiveness in a world 
limiting carbon emissions requires continually 
increasing the value of each tonne of carbon 
emitted, or in other words, increasing carbon 
productivity.42 The level of a country’s carbon 
productivity is a high-level indication of that 
country’s ability to prosper in a world where 
carbon emissions are constrained.  
Improvements in carbon productivity are largely 
driven by two key factors: improvements in 
energy productivity, whereby more value is 
generated from the energy used, and reductions 
in the carbon intensity, whereby the pollution 
produced by outputs is reduced.43 
Energy efficiency is an important element of 
energy productivity: reducing the amount of 
energy required per unit of output lowers the 
production cost per unit. (Other factors driving 
energy productivity are energy prices and 
economic structure.)  
In the face of a long-term rise in fuel and carbon 
prices, cutting input costs through more efficient 
energy use can become an important source of 
productivity and competitive advantage for 
companies. Similar benefits accrue to national 
economies: energy efficiency decreases spending 
on fuel and energy infrastructure, can suppress 
energy prices and stimulates economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
New research by Vivid Economics, commissioned 
by The Climate Institute and industrial giant GE, 
has found that a 1 per cent increase in the level of 
a country’s energy efficiency causes a 0.1 per 
cent increase in the rate of economic growth per 
person in that year.44 Applying this relationship to 
projections for Australia, an annual 1 per cent 
increase in energy efficiency would boost 2030 
GDP per capita by 2.26 per cent or $1,200 per 
person, and total GDP by $26 billion. 
Modelled impact on Australia’s carbon 
competitiveness 
The modelling finds that the Coalition policy 
scenarios slightly improve carbon productivity of 
the economy over the coming decades. By 2020 
economic output per unit of carbon emissions is 
increased by around 6.4 per cent. This is around a 
third less than the improvement driven by the 
carbon laws.  
Over the period to 2030, the carbon laws roughly 
double the current rate of carbon productivity 
improvement while the Coalition policy scenarios 
see little improvement over a scenario where no 
action is taken. Neither the carbon laws nor the 
Coalition policy scenarios match global rates of 
improvements implied by Treasury modelling of a 
world limiting carbon emissions45 (Fig. 9). Similar 
results are observed for changes in the carbon 
intensity of the economy.  
It is likely that change in the emission intensity of 
energy is the key driver of overall carbon 
productivity (Fig. 10). Both parties’ policies 
improve Australia’s energy productivity, although 
not to levels implied by the targets of other major 
economies (Fig. 11). For example, in 2020 energy 
productivity under the current laws and the 
Coalition’s policies is projected to be around 25 
per cent below that implied by the USA’s policy 
commitments.   
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Figure 9. Average annual rate of change in 
carbon productivity by decade. The average 
annual rate of improvement in carbon productivity 
of the Australian economy is shown for the full 
range of scenarios assessed. Global rates of 
change based on Treasury’s previous global 
modelling of a medium and ambitious global 
action are also shown as indicative comparisons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Average annual rate of change in 
carbon intensity by decade. The average annual 
rate of decline in carbon intensity of the Australian 
economy is shown for the full range of scenarios 
assessed. Global rates of change based on 
Treasury’s previous global modelling of a medium 
and ambitious global action are also shown as 
indicative comparisons. 
 
 
  
Figure 9 & 10 Source:  
The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM MMA, 
2013 and Treasury, 2011 
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Figure 11. Average annual rate of change in 
energy productivity by decade.  Australia’s 
projected change in energy productivity is also 
compared to targets being implemented in the 
USA, the EU and China.46 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013; 
International Energy Agency, 2012; US Department of Agriculture, 
2012; US Energy Information Agency, 2012 and Department of 
Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2013. 
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Policy impact on renewable energy generation 
The impact of the different Coalition options on 
renewable energy generation is driven by the 
interaction between two key factors: changes to 
the Renewable Energy Target and removal of the 
carbon price in 2014. 
The carbon price increases the viability of 
renewable investments by raising the wholesale 
electricity price, reducing the need for renewable 
energy certificates generated under the legislated 
target, and hence reducing the certificate price. 
As liable parties under the Renewable Energy 
Target can choose to pay a penalty instead of 
purchasing renewable energy certificates, the 
penalty price acts as a cap on the value of 
certificates. With no carbon price, paying the 
penalty becomes an increasingly economic option 
once the price of renewable certificates reaches 
parity with the penalty. At this point firms pay the 
penalty and do not invest in renewable 
generation.  
 With the Renewable Energy Target unchanged, 
the Coalition’s policy to remove the carbon price 
forces renewable energy certificates up to the 
penalty threshold and reduces renewable energy 
generation to 22 per cent by 2020, compared with 
24 per cent under the current legislation. 
 
Figure 12. Projected electricity generation: 
2020. 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This produces an equivalent result to reducing the 
RET (whereby the target is shifted to 25 per cent 
renewable generation by 2025).  
Reducing the RET costs an additional $250 
million in emission reductions needed to reach the 
minimum target.  
Other analysts have pointed out that reducing the 
RET also increases wholesale electricity prices 
and increases investment risk premiums. For 
example, modelling by Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance shows that most of the drop in cost of a 
reduced RET is offset by an increase in wholesale 
electricity costs .47 The combined costs of 
additional emissions reduction and wholesale 
electricity suggest there is no material economic 
benefit resulting from a reduced RET.  
The impact of removing the carbon price is most 
stark in the scenario where the Renewable Energy 
Target is increased to 50 per cent by 2030 (‘High 
RET’). While more renewable energy is achieved 
than in other scenarios, investment in renewable 
generation falls well short of the target.  
In the longer term, without a high carbon price 
there is also no incentive to adopt carbon capture 
and storage technologies and these are not 
deployed in the Coalition scenarios. Under the 
current carbon laws, on a cumulative basis to 
2050, approximately 3 per cent of generation is 
from coal sources is equipped with CCS and with 
around 5 per cent of gas. This is all deployed after 
2030. 
  
  36 
 
Figure 13. Projected electricity generation: 
2030. 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Projected electricity generation: 
2050. Note that under the Carbon laws around 35 
per cent of projected thermal generation uses 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). Without a 
carbon price to make CCS investments viable the 
technology is not deployed in the Coalition 
scenarios. 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013 
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Australia has defined its national climate interest 
as avoiding a 2ºC increase in global temperature 
above pre-industrial levels. This is a goal which 
both major political parties share and one to 
which over 190 nations have agreed. 
This is the ultimate test against which parties’ 
proposed policy must be assessed. Does the 
policy allow Australia to play its fair part in global 
efforts to achieve this outcome?  
Specifically, is the policy scalable to enable 
emission reductions of 25 per cent by 2020 and in 
the order of 60 per cent by 2030? Does the policy 
position the Australian economy to manage the 
risks and opportunities of a world seeking to 
avoid this level of dangerous climate change? 
Does the policy position Australia to play a 
constructive role in building global ambition and 
facilitating international investment in low-
pollution technologies? 
The Coalition’s climate change policy, as it is 
currently outlined, is unlikely to help deliver 
Australia’s national climate interest. 
Based on The Climate Institute’s analysis, the 
core challenges confronting the Coalition are that 
the current proposed policy framework: 
+ increases emissions and lacks scalability 
+ risks undermining Australia’s positive 
influence internationally and undermining 
global action  
+ does not make emitters responsible for 
their pollution, effectively subsidising high 
carbon behaviours 
Increases emissions and lacks 
scalability 
The independent modelling presented here 
suggests that, across the range of Coalition policy 
permutations, Australia’s emissions will continue 
to increase to 2020 and beyond. Across the 
Coalition policy scenarios, emissions increase in 
the order of nine per cent on 2000 levels by 2020. 
This is broadly consistent with other analyses. 
With unlimited funds and seamless policy 
implementation the Coalition’s policy frameworks 
could theoretically achieve Australia’s 5 to 25 per 
cent reduction targets by 2020.  
However, beyond the practicality of implementing 
the proposed policy framework, the core issue 
remains that the policy constrains budget 
expenditure but doesn’t constrain emissions. The 
money available, based on all independent 
analysis to date, is insufficient to reduce 
Australia’s emissions in line with the bipartisan 
supported target range. 
The scalability of the ERF is even starker after 
2020. Even with ongoing and increasing 
budgetary outlays in the order of $88 billion to 
2050, in modelled scenarios emissions continue 
to rise around 45 per cent above 2000 levels over 
this timeframe. 
The international community is currently 
negotiating a new global agreement to limit 
emissions from all major emitters. This agreement 
will set the nature of post-2020 emission 
reductions commitments for all major economies. 
Any new commitment for the post-2020 period for 
Australia will very likely be significantly more 
Discussion 
Questions of scale, diplomacy  
and transformation 
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stringent than the current 5–25 per cent 2020 
targets. This underscores the need to ensure the 
nation can deliver much deeper reductions in a 
little over a decade than currently pledged. It will 
place significant pressure on the 2015 Coalition 
review to revisit emissions trading in 2015 when it 
reviews its policy framework.  
Risks undermining Australia’s 
positive influence internationally 
The credibility and ambition of Australia’s 
domestic policy settings will become more 
important under the new 2015 agreement.48 A 
policy that can meet stated international targets is 
central to strengthening the emerging 
architecture, building global ambition, and 
avoiding negative responses from other major 
economies. 
Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and establishing the 
current carbon laws with scalable pollution limits 
allows Australia to play a more proactive and 
positive role in brokering agreements between 
different negotiating blocs. For example, 
Australia’s credibility in ratifying Kyoto’s first 
commitment period and introducing carbon bills 
was central to its role in establishing the 
Cartagena Dialogue. The Cartagena Dialogue 
brings together progressive countries spanning 
the developing and developed world to explore 
areas of convergence in country positions and 
find potential areas of joint action.49 The 
Cartagena Dialogue played a pivotal role, for 
example, in securing the Cancun Agreement in 
2010. 
To further illustrate the point, Australia’s economy 
looks very similar to Canada’s, in that both 
countries are large, advanced, Anglophone 
resource producers. However, unlike Canada, 
Australia has ‘skin in the game’ of international 
climate policymaking. Australia’s participation in 
the Kyoto Protocol and enacted domestic policies 
means we are more credible and have more 
leverage than Canada. This diplomatic capacity 
and political leverage provides a progressive 
voice, in contrast with some of our more 
regressive counterparts. 
In short, Australia’s ability to achieve 
internationally committed targets will influence 
both its posture and its role in international 
negotiations. This matters in three main fronts in 
particular: 
+ International posture. If the Government 
does not have credible domestic policy 
settings that allow it to meet international 
commitments it will, at best, force the 
nation into a defensive position 
internationally. At worst, it would force the 
Government into a regressive position 
where the country walks backward on 
current commitments and actively works 
with similar nations to undermine the 
development of a robust and ambitious 
international framework. 
+ Works against some business interests. 
Like the Government, the Coalition has 
committed to implement policies to reduce 
emissions. This imposes a (small) cost on 
the economy. It is therefore in Australia’s 
interest to pursue active diplomacy to 
ensure other countries are similarly 
implementing policies to reduce 
emissions. This effort is weakened by not 
having a credible domestic policy 
framework in place.    
+ 2014: the year of ambition. Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, which enjoys bipartisan 
support, Australia has signed an 
agreement to take on a new binding 
international emission reduction 
commitment spanning the period from 
2013–2020. This agreement includes a 
process to lift the ambition of these 
commitments in 2014.50 The UN Secretary 
General is also convening a meeting of 
world leaders in 2014 to build short-term 
emissions ambitions and momentum for 
the new 2015 climate agreement. The 
2014 G20 meeting is an opportunity for 
Australia to facilitate emerging ambition 
and build on strengthening climate co-
operation among major emitters China and 
the United States.  Australia’s support for 
a stronger emission target will be 
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influential among other middle powers and 
provide a counterpoint to regressive 
actions by countries seeking to weaken 
ambition. The opposite is also true. 
Does not make emitters responsible 
for their pollution  
The ability of the ERF to deliver broad scale 
investment in low-pollution activities is 
undermined by three main factors: 
+ Subsidising carbon pollution; 
+ Lack of a broad-based investment 
incentive; 
+ Limited impact on the competitiveness of 
coal and other emission intensive 
activities. 
Subsidising carbon pollution 
The International Monetary Fund estimates that 
Australia’s 2011 post-tax subsidies to fossil fuels 
equate to around 2 per cent GDP and around 6 
per cent of Government revenues.51 This includes 
the subsidy associated with not pricing carbon (at 
that time) in line with US government estimates of 
cost of climate change impacts of around 
A$27/tonne. This US benchmark has been recent 
increased and may be a substantial 
underestimation of the cost of climate change. 
For example, the Canadian Government uses 
climate impacts costs of up to A$120/tonne in 
regulatory impact analysis.52   
The IMF concludes that energy subsidies 
generally have wide-ranging economic impacts 
and that:  
Negative externalities from energy subsidies 
are substantial. Subsidies cause 
overconsumption of petroleum products, 
coal, and natural gas, and reduce incentives 
for investment in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy. 
The Coalition’s policy currently does not include a 
broad-based price on carbon emissions as the 
carbon penalty applies only to emissions above 
yet-to-be-determined business-as-usual 
baselines. This implicitly subsidises below 
baseline emissions. 
Using a similar approach to that used by the IMF, 
The Climate Institute calculates that this subsidy 
equates to around $50 billion to 2020 and 0.4 per 
cent of GDP over this period.  
Note that even with the emissions penalty, in 
most modelled Coalition scenarios firms largely 
avoid paying the carbon price because it is set in 
way that applies only if companies undertake 
activities that exceed business as usual levels. 
However, through time industries naturally 
become more efficient and adopt more 
productive technologies and practices. These 
means that they do not generally exceed the 
baseline set in the modelling. This appears to be 
the intent of the Coalition’s policy. 
In the scenario where baselines decline over time 
companies play the penalty and/or purchase a 
domestic or international emission offset for a 
higher proportion of their emissions. In this case, 
a limited direct carbon prices applies, albeit on 
only a small proportion of emissions. Stronger 
reductions in intensity baselines than presented 
here could increase penalty payments and 
provide a stronger incentive to investment in 
emission reduction activities.   
Lack of a broad based investment incentive 
The replacement of the carbon laws with the ERF 
removes two broad-based incentives to 
investment in low-emissions technologies. 
The first incentive is the direct carbon price itself, 
which applies to a wide range of sources of 
emissions and changes the relative costs and 
benefits of all emitting activities. In contrast, 
under the ERF the scope of the available emission 
reductions is limited by budget expenditure. 
The second incentive is the impact of the carbon 
price on energy prices. The removal of a carbon 
price will reduce energy prices and consequently 
reduce the uptake of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy unless other equivalent 
incentives are provided. While energy demand is 
not highly responsive to changes in price in the 
short term, price increases do affect demand in 
the medium to long term. In the modelling, energy 
efficiency is reduced by 0.8 per cent in cumulative 
terms to 2050 without a carbon price in place. 
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Limited impact on the competitiveness of coal 
and other emission intensive activities 
The ability of emission intensive firms to pass on 
carbon price costs is to a greater or less extent 
limited by competitive pressures in the market. 
For example, estimates and experience show that 
coal-fired generators will be able to pass on only 
a proportion of their carbon costs to energy 
consumers.53 The Australian Industry Group has 
estimated that businesses in the manufacturing, 
services and construction sectors have initially 
passed through just 6 per cent of their self-
estimated carbon costs in the first year of carbon 
pricing.54 
 
 
Figure 15 Climate damages, carbon prices, 
and subsidies in the stationary energy sector: 
2013–2020 (NPV $billions). Climate damages are 
calculated using the same method used by the 
IMF. Total emissions are multiplied by the social 
cost of carbon emissions used by the US 
Government.55,56 Carbon prices are calculated by 
multiplying emissions by the carbon pricing 
applied to them under each scenario. In the case 
of the Coalition’s policies this is the penalty paid 
for exceeding baselines. To generate the net 
subsidy carbon pricing is subtracted from climate 
damages over the period to 2020. 
Source: The Climate Institute analysis based on SKM–MMA, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This means that in order to remain competitive in 
the markets in which they operate emissions-
intensive firms must absorb some or all of their 
carbon costs, and will be less profitable, unless 
they can reduce their emissions intensity. 
To illustrate: without a broad based carbon price 
coal-fired generation continues to supply around 
60-70 per cent of electricity generation. This is the 
case even in scenarios where the Renewable 
Energy Target is expanded. While there is 
certainly a reduction in coal-based generation in 
these scenarios, in the absence of carbon pricing, 
the very low cost of brown coal generation 
remains competitive for many decades.  
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Based on The Climate Institute’s and other 
independent analysis of the Coalition Emission 
Reduction Fund we recommend that the Coalition 
consider the follow steps. 
Cutting pollution 
All independent analysis to date indicates that the 
ERF in its current form cannot deliver emission 
reductions consistent with a 5 per cent reduction 
let alone the potential for a 25 per cent reduction 
to which the Coalition has also committed. This 
contrasts the current carbon laws which, 
depending on the ambition of the emission cap to 
be set in 2014, can achieve up to a 25 per cent 
reduction in emissions by 2020.  
The Coalition should make a firm commitment 
maintain the current legislative framework at least 
until the completion of detailed policy 
development and further independent analysis of 
the potential of the Emission Reduction Fund to 
achieve up to a 25 per cent reduction in 
emissions on 2000 levels by 2020. This should 
also include examination of the ERF in the context 
of Australia’s fair share of a long term global 
carbon budget consistent with helping to meet 
the national climate interest of avoiding a 2oC 
increase in global temperature.  
This independent analysis should include: 
+ Subjecting the Emission Reduction Fund and 
associated climate policies to rigorous 
Regulation Impact Statement as outlined in 
the Coalition’s Policy to Boost Productivity 
and Reduce Regulation.57 This should include 
consideration of the social cost of carbon58 
and post-tax subsidies to emitting 
behaviours59. 
+ The White Paper process that is proposed to 
develop the specific details of the policy 
should involve Treasury undertaking an 
independent modelling of emission reductions 
associated with proposed ERF frameworks. 
This modelling should examine scenarios to 
expand the scope and scale of the ERF to 
include Government purchase of credible 
international emissions units to ensure 
Australia’s international obligations are 
achieved. 
+ Respecting the currently legislated review by 
the Climate Change Authority of Australia’s 
carbon emission caps, budgets and targets. 
This review aligns with international processes 
in 2014 to increase emission reductions 
ambitions before 2020 and should be a key 
input into the ERF White Paper process and 
Australia submissions on pre-2020 ambition 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Boosting low carbon investment 
The key barrier in the short term to boosting low-
pollution investment is removing the policy 
uncertainty created by a two-year review of the 
Renewable Energy Target.60 The Coalition should 
commit to remove the legislated 2014 and focus 
the 2016 review on post-2020 policy settings. 
In addition, alongside any policy development of 
the ERF, the Coalition should explicitly consider 
setting declining emission baselines and carbon 
penalties for covered firms that is consistent with 
driving sustained decarbonisation of major 
emitting sectors. 
Finally, if committed to remove the current 
legislated framework, given the broad-based 
Conclusions 
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subsidisation of polluting activities, limited public 
funds to drive investment, and a declared 
preference not to pursue broad market-based 
measures, the Coalition should examine 
additional regulatory approaches to drive 
structural change in the economy.61 This would 
include: 
+ Expand the Renewable Energy Target. 
Active consideration should be given to 
legislating a 2030 fixed GWh target to ensure 
around 50 per cent of generation is renewable 
energy. The 2020 target would remain 
unchanged and penalty prices should be 
adjusted to reflect the change in the 2030 
target. Higher targets could be complemented 
by including carbon capture and storage 
options as possible suppliers of clean energy 
certificates. 
+ Regulate a declining emission performance 
standard for existing power generation. 
This would initially be set to ensure the most 
emission intensive power generation is 
decommissioned by 202062 and decline 
through time to ensure by 2030 the power 
sector is nearing decarbonisation. The United 
States is now moving to directly regulate 
emissions from existing power stations; some 
proposals give power plant owners the 
freedom to choose how they would meet the 
required emission standards, for example by 
giving credit for increases in energy efficiency 
and electricity generation using renewable 
energy.63  
+ Implement are more consistent, ambitious 
and stable policy framework to drive a step 
change in energy efficiency. Policies to 
achieve this step-change could include: 
- A national energy productivity target of a 
30 per cent improvement on 2010 levels. 
- Expanding state-based energy saving 
schemes into a nationally consistent and 
robust Energy Saving Initiative covering 
the whole country. Modelling of a national 
ESI targeting 5 per cent energy savings 
found potential net benefits of up to $3.5 
billion and emissions reductions of about 
30–70 million tonnes by 2050.64   
- Implementing ambitious emissions or 
efficiency standards for vehicles 
equivalent to United States standards by 
2015 and European standards by 2020. 
Europe requires light vehicle 
manufacturers to meet increasingly 
stringent limits on CO2 emissions: for 
example, new car fleets must average 130 
g CO2/km by 2015 and 95g/km by 2020. 
Benefits to consumers from reduced fuel 
usage over the vehicle life are estimated at 
$2,500.65 
- Using the new national framework for 
regulating Minimum Energy Performance 
Standards (MEPS) to drive more ambitious 
equipment standards. One method would 
be to adapt Japan’s ‘Top Runner’ 
program, where ever-higher performance 
standards are set by the most energy-
efficient products.66 
- Pricing that more accurately reflects the 
true costs of energy use: time-of-use and 
critical peak electricity pricing; removal of 
fossil fuel subsidies and pricing of 
externalities (e.g. reform of fuel tax system 
to fully address costs over and above road 
use ). 
- Strengthen the implementation of 
identified energy efficiency opportunities 
requirements under the energy Efficiency 
Opportunities program for large energy 
users. Analysis of participants’ data has 
found that around 60 per cent of identified 
energy savings are not implemented, 
resulting in energy waste worth $2 billion 
per year, and additional emissions of 
approximately 8.5 Mt CO2.67    
- National implementation of mandatory 
energy efficiency disclosure at point of 
sale or lease to residential buildings. There 
has been no progress on this element of 
the COAG-agreed National Strategy for 
Energy Efficiency.68 Also consider 
targeting a certain proportion of the ERF 
towards retrofitting the existing building 
stock.
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